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This study was designed to quantitatively investigate the economy-wide impact of 
land reform policies in Zimbabwe. Land reforms came with the realm of independence 
in Zimbabwe. Four models were used to implement the reform policies. The paper uses 
the updated 1991 Social Accounting Matrix for Zimbabwe and the Central Statistics 
Office’s household data on resettled families in Zimbabwe. The paper computes the 
sectoral SAM multipliers and then uses household data on resettled families to 
simulate the impact of specific land reform models on the economy. The simulated 
results show that land reform, if well planned and systematically and carefully 
implemented, could generate economy-wide benefits for Zimbabwe and could lead to 
income redistribution in favour of low-income household groups, while maintaining 




The post-independence government of Zimbabwe inherited a highly skewed 
pattern of land distribution, which had a small minority of white large-scale 
farmers owning a disproportionately large share of the better agricultural 
land, while the majority of the national population farmed in the lower rainfall 
and poorer soil (Chitsike, 2003:2). During the colonial era, land was distributed 
on racial lines, with approximately 4,660 large-scale predominantly white 
commercial farmers owning about 14.8 million hectares and about 6 million 
black smallholder farmers owning about 16.4 million hectares in mainly low 
agricultural potential areas. Small-scale commercial farmers occupied about 1 
million hectares, while state-owned farms occupied about 0.3 million hectares 
and 6.0 million hectares were reserved for national parks, wildlife and urban 
settlements (Rugube and Chambati, 2001:7; UNDP, 1998; CSO, 1998). After 
independence, land redistribution was highest on the list of the new 
government’s priorities. It therefore proposed an intensive resettlement 
programme with the following objectives: 
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i)  Alleviating population pressure in the communal areas; 
ii)  Extending and improving the base of productive agriculture in the 
peasant farming sector; 
iii)  Improving the standard of living of the largest and poorest sector of the 
population; 
iv)  Improving the problems of and rehabilitating those adversely affected by 
the war; 
v)  Providing for the landless and the destitute; 
vi)  Bringing into full production the under-utilized land; and 
vii)  Expanding and improving the infrastructure and services that were 
needed to promote the wellbeing of people and economic production 
(Chitsike, 2003:3; Lebert, 2003:4). 
 
Various policies and legislated Acts, from market-based government purchase 
and redistribution to compulsory acquisition of commercial farms without 
compensation, have been implemented or passed by the government to 
achieve the objectives of land redistribution. However, post-implementation 
macroeconomic indicators show that the gross domestic product has 
contracted by six percent in 2000 and eight percent in 2001 and was predicted 
to further contract in subsequent years (ECA, 2002). Output in the agricultural, 
mining and manufacturing sectors declined substantially in 2001, leading to 
many company closures and job losses. At least 25,000 jobs were lost in the 
manufacturing sector in the first quarter of 2001 (ECA, 2002). With these 
indicators, the viability of land reform in Zimbabwe is questionable. This 
study is therefore designed to undertake an economy-wide analysis of the 
possible benefits of land reform in Zimbabwe. Robilliard et al (2002) and 
Deininger et al (2002) separately carried out a cost-benefit study to analyze the 
impact of land reform in Zimbabwe. The findings suggest that land reform in 
Zimbabwe has a significant positive impact on the incomes and living 
standard of the target beneficiaries. However, these studies investigated 
micro-level benefits and costs, thereby neglecting an economy-wide coverage. 
For example, the impact of land redistribution/resettlement on the non-
agriculture sectors, like the provision of services, the performance of the 
manufacturing sector and returns on capital were not adequately addressed in 
these studies. On the other hand, Bautista and Thomas (2000) did a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis of trade and agricultural 
policy reforms in Zimbabwe and concluded that land reform policies cannot 
simultaneously promote overall income growth and equity. Computable 
general equilibrium analysis, in addition to its complex assumptions, requires 
experts to interpret the results, which is still lacking among most of the 
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economic policy advisers in Africa. In between these two there is the need for 
a simpler model that has an economy-wide coverage. Therefore, using the 
social accounting matrix multiplier approach, this study is designed to 
quantitatively investigate the impact of land redistribution on output growth, 
household income generation and gross value added. 
 
Section 2 discusses the land reform programme in Zimbabwe since 
independence and the land reform models. Section 3 discusses the structure of 
the 1991 SAM for Zimbabwe, explains the general method and the modeling 
procedure used for the study and the shocks applied in the model to simulate 
the impact of land reforms, while section 4 presents and discusses the 
empirical results. Section 5 summarizes the findings, draws conclusions from 
the results, recommends the most viable development options for Zimbabwe 
and highlights areas for further study on a related topic. 
 
2.  Land reform in Zimbabwe since independence 
 
The post-independence land reform in Zimbabwe started with the Lancaster 
House Agreement, in which it was agreed that land should change hands 
through a willing seller-willing buyer mechanism with the white framers who 
wanted to continue farming being free to do so (Lebert, 2003:4; Chitsike, 2003).  
 
The land reform programme was targeted at the landless, war veterans, the 
poor and commercial farm workers. At independence in 1980 about 70 percent 
of Zimbabwe’s landmass, including communal areas, was owned by the state 
and 24 percent owned by large-scale commercial farmers. 
 
In 1980, the targeted number of households for resettlement was 18,000 on 1.5 
million hectares of land over five years, which was revised in 1982 and 1990 to 
include 162,000 farming families on 8.3 million hectares of land (Chitsike, 
2003:4; World Bank, 1991). Between 1980 and 2000 there were numerous 
amendments to both the constitution and Land Acquisition Act, because the  
funds promised by the former colonial government to the post-independence 
leaders of Zimbabwe were not provided as agreed at the pre-independence 
Lancaster House conference. There was also an increasing political pressure on 
the government to fulfil its promises to the people. 
 
Table 1 shows the number of hectares of land owned by the various categories 
immediately before independence and by the end of the 1990s. This shows that 
3.6 million hectares of land was transferred mainly from large scale 
commercial farmers to resettled families. In percentage terms, this transfer 
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represents about 23.6 percent of land from large scale commercial farmers to 
the resettled families. 
 
Table 1:  Land distribution at and after independence  
Land category  1980 
(million ha) 
1997 







Communal areas  16.4  16.4  0.0  0 
Resettlement areas  0.0  3.6  3.6  -- 
Smallholder areas  1.0  1.1  0.1  -- 
Large scale commercial area  14.8  11.3  -3.5  (23.68) 
State farms  0.3  0.1  -0.2  (66.7) 
National parks, wild life and 
urban settlements 
6.0 6.0  0.0  0 
Total  38.5 38.5  0.0  0 
Source: CSO (1998); Rugube and Chambati (2001). 
 
The implementation of the land resettlement programme was planned in four 
models (A, B, C, and D): 
 
A)  Intensive re-settlement on individual family basis: settler families were 
allocated residential stands, about five hectares of land for arable 
purposes and access to communal grazing land. Land was acquired by 
the state and apportioned into plots, and the plots re-distributed to the 
beneficiaries. Beneficiaries acquired tenure in the form of permits, one for 
settlement, one for cultivation and one for grazing. This was the 
dominant model used to implement land reform policies in Zimbabwe. 
Model A scheme accounts for about 90 percent of the overall land reform 
policy implementation (Deininger, Hoogeveen and Kinsey, 2002). 
B)  Village settlement with cooperative farming, which involved the 
formation of cooperatives to collectively manage farms purchased by the 
government and take over existing large commercial farms. This model 
was not intensively implemented as the cooperative schemes set up did 
not survive for long. 
C)  State farm with out-growers. This model required the commercial estate 
or processing facility and the settler farmers as out-growers. Beneficiaries 
were intensively re-settled around a core estate, providing labour for the 
estate and in turn receiving services from the estate. This model was not 
also extensively implemented. 
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D)  Commercial grazing for communal areas. This was implemented in the 
southern parts of Zimbabwe, where commercial ranches were purchased 
for the development of livestock. 
 
By the end of 1996, a total of 71,000 farm families were re-settled on 3.6 million 
hectares of land out of the proposed 162,000 on 8.3 million hectares in 1990. 
The area of small-scale farms increased from 1 million in 1980 to 1.1 million in 
1997, while the area of large scale commercial farms decreased from 14.8 
million hectares in 1980 to 11.3 million hectares in 1997 and state-owned farms 
from 0.3 million in 1980 to 0.1 in 1997 (GoZ, 1999; CSO, 1998; Chitsike, 2003). 
 
3. Methodology   
 
This section is sub-divided into the sources of data, the theoretical framework 
and the modeling procedure, balancing the SAM and an explanation of the 
simulations applied to the SAM 
 
3.1 Data  sources 
 
The SAM used for the purpose of this paper was extracted from the 1991 micro 
SAM developed by Thomas and Bautista (1999). This was complemented by 
household data provided by the Central Statistics Office of Zimbabwe. The 
land transactions data used in this study are secondary data obtained from the 
deeds registries in Harare and Bulawayo. These data were used to compute 
the changes in land ownership between 1980 and 1997. The 1991 micro SAM 
has 36 activities and 30 commodities accounts, which are classified into 27 
production sectors (15 of which are agriculture, forestry and fishery accounts, 
a mining account, 6 manufacturing accounts, an electricity and water account, 
a construction account and 3 other services accounts). It also identifies 9 
primary factors of production (4 labour, 3 capital and 2 land categories), an 
enterprise account, 5 household groups, the government sector, which consists 
of 4 accounts (government transfer payments, direct taxes, indirect taxes and 
import taxes), investment and savings and the rest of the world.  
 
For this study, the 88 accounts in the 1991 Micro SAM were aggregated to 26 
accounts, consisting of 7 production/commodities accounts (large-scale 
agriculture, smallholder agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, 
electricity and water, and other services), 9 primary factors of production (four 
labour, three capital and two land categories), 7 institutions (enterprises, 5 
household groups and government), investment and the rest of the world 
sectors, (Juana and Mabugu, 2005:346-349). 
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The 15 agricultural commodities and 24 activities accounts were aggregated 
into two activities/commodities accounts (large-scale and smallholder 
agriculture). The reason is that land transfer is predominantly from large-scale 
to smallholder agriculture. The manufacturing sector in the micro SAM, which 
consists of 6 commodities and 6 activities (grain milling, other food 
processing, textiles, other light manufacturing, fertilizer and agro-chemicals, 
and other manufacturing) were aggregated to a single manufacturing account. 
Similarly, the trade and transport and public and private services in the 1991 
micro SAM were aggregated into one services account. The mining, electricity 
and construction accounts were retained as they are in the micro SAM. 
 
The three primary factors identified in the micro SAM are labour, capital and 
land. For further factor analyses, labour is sub-divided into large scale 
unskilled labour, formal unskilled labour, informal small holder unskilled 
labour, and skilled labour. The skilled labour includes both agricultural and 
non-agricultural skilled workers. Large scale unskilled labour is 
predominantly made up of unskilled farm workers. Informal unskilled 
labourers are the smallholder farmers and the non-agriculture informal 
workers. The formal unskilled labourers are the unskilled workers who reside 
in urban areas (Juana and Mabugu, 2005). 
 
Capital is sub-divided into large scale farm capital, smallholder farm capital, 
and non-agriculture capital, while land is sub-divided into large scale 
commercial land and smallholder land. The study assumes that land is 
predominantly used for agricultural activities. The two land sub-categories 
reflect the dualistic nature of agriculture in Zimbabwe. Hence, income 
accruing to large-scale land is large-scale agriculture income and that accruing 
to small-scale land is smallholder agriculture income. The sub-divisions help 
to ascertain the proportion of payments from the production sectors to each of 
the factor inputs. This assists policy makers/advisers to design policies that 
will stimulate higher economic growth and poverty reduction. Payments to 
factors of production go to households and institutions. For example 
payments to unskilled labour mostly go to poor rural households, while 
payments to capital go to enterprises owned by urban or rich households.  
 
Three institutions are identified; enterprises, households and government. By 
assumption, government expenditure is exogenously determined. This has 
some impact on the production and total impact multipliers. There are five 
distinctive household groups; three rural and two urban. The three rural 
household groups are large scale owners/managers, large scale farm-workers 
and smallholders. These distinctions are made based on the socio-economic 
characteristics of the two farming systems. The two urban households 
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identified are urban high and low income households. This urban household 
distinction reflects the differences in the sources and levels of income. The 
1997 household data provided by the Central Statistics Office in Zimbabwe 
was used to update the household accounts in the 1991 micro SAM. In 
addition to government, other exogenous accounts are investment accounts 
and the rest of the world.   
  
3.2  The theoretical framework and the modelling procedure 
 
The study computed the SAM multipliers using the material balance equation, 
which is explained developed by Sadoulet and De Janvry (1995) and Bautista 
et al (2002), and explained and used in Juana and Mabugu (2005). The basic 
materials balance equation can be specified as: 
F AY Y
l l + =  (1) 
Where Yl is an nx1 column vector of total sectoral output, A is an n x n matrix 
of direct technical coefficients for the endogenous factors and F is an nx1 
column vector of final demand. The dimension of the ‘A’ matrix coincides 
with the number of productive sectors. Solving for Yl from equation 1 leads to: 
 
F A I Y
l 1 ) (
− − =  (2) 
 
Where ‘I’ is the identity matrix and (I-A)-1 is the Leontief inverse. The input-
output model is concerned with solving for the sectoral output levels (Y) that 
satisfy final demand for those outputs (F) given the inter-industry structure of 
production or the intermediate input requirements of the production sectors 
(A). The model is used to determine the production plan that is consistent with 
a desired final demand vector, given the inter-sectoral transactions matrix (A). 
The above equation can be used to derive various types of multipliers, the 
most common of which are the production and income multipliers. Equation 2 
can be reduced to: 
 
1 ) 1 (
− − = = A M where F M Y
l l l  (3) 
 
Therefore, Ml is the input-output multiplier matrix, referred to in literature as 
the Leontief inverse.  The vectors Yl and F represent sectoral output and final 
demand respectively. Equation 3 can be used to calculate the endogenous 
incomes associated with any changes of the total exogenous accounts, given 
the multiplier matrix. It can also be used to analyze the effects on output 
arising from exogenous shocks, such as changes in investment or government 
expenditure or the rest of the world, that change final demand. Each cell in the 
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multiplier matrix Ml interprets the total income change in the row account 
induced by an exogenous income injection in the column account. With the 
production sectors, the multipliers indicate how a unit increase in the sector’s 
production due to exogenous shocks stimulates economy-wide output growth. 
 
Equation 3 can be extended to the SAM multiplier matrix by the inclusion of 
the primary factors and the consumption accounts to the production sectors. 
The inclusion of these accounts aim at incorporating the feedback from rents 
to consumption to new production that originates from an exogenous inflow. 
Let Am be the enlarged square matrix of direct propensities computed from the 
SAM and Ms the enlarged inverse (SAM multiplier) matrix. Hence Ms can be 
computed as: 
 
1 ) ( ,
− − = = m
s s s A I M where F M Y  (4) 
 
Equation 4 solves for the equilibrium level of all endogenous accounts which 
result from a shock or exogenous injections, given by changes in the elements 
of the exogenous accounts. The multiplier matrix Ms measures the direct and 
indirect impacts of the incorporated endogenous links and reduces to Ml when 
the dimension m of the Am matrix corresponds to A (Boughanmi et al, 2002). 
The difference between Ms and Ml is due to the induced effect which is taken 
into account by Ms, but not by Ml. 
 
Economic multipliers estimate the economy-wide impact of changing one 
variable on related variables in a specified economy, such as a state or a 
province, suggesting a strict cause-effect relationship (Tanjuakio et al, 1996). In 
this study, the model estimates the economy-wide impact of redistributing 
land from large-scale owners to smallholders. 
 
Knowing the multiplier matrix (1-A)-1 and the final demand for goods and 
services, the output level that satisfies the demand can be computed by 
multiplying the multiplier matrix by the final demand. That is; 
 
1 1 * ) 1 ( Y F A = −
−  (5) 
 
Equation 5 is used to validate the computed multipliers and also shows the 
impact of exogenous shocks to the entries in the social accounting matrix on 
output, through its impact on the coefficient matrix, hence the multipliers. To 
capture the changes in output, subtract the former level of output before the 
shock, from the new level of output after the shock has been applied to the 
SAM. The difference shows the change in output resulting from the shock, 
which changes the level of intermediate demand in different ways for different 
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sectors, hence the different elements in the coefficient matrix. Algebraically, 





2 )] 1 ( ) 1 [( * ) 1 ( * ) 1 ( Y A A F A F A ∆ = − − − = − − −
− −  (6) 
 
Where A2 represents the changes in the technical coefficients matrix that result 
from the shocks applied to the SAM. The technical coefficients change because 
the shocks lead a change in the input requirements. Equation 6 shows the 
change in output arising from changes in the entries due to policy 
implementation that lead to increases or decreases in intermediate input 
requirements. 
 
3.3 Balancing  the  SAM 
 
To verify that the SAM is balanced, three approaches were used:  
 
i)  For each account, the column total equals the row total;  
ii)  In the coefficient matrix, the column coefficients are each less than or 
equal to unity and each column’s coefficients sum up to unity. A column 
coefficient is only equal to unity when that account is predominantly 
supplied or used by only one account. For example all large-scale land is 
predominantly owned by large-scale owner and used in large-scale 
agriculture. However, the equality of the sum of column coefficients to 
unity is still maintained. Table A1 in the appendix presents the calculated 
matrix of technical coefficients; and  
iii)  The product of the multiplier matrix and the final demand vector is equal 
to the column vector of the sectoral output. 
 
The computed SAM multiplier matrix, which is presented on Table A2 in the 
appendix, was used to investigate the impact of changes in land ownership on 




The SAM entries are in million Zimbabwean Dollars, but the land transactions 
are reported in physical quantities like millions of hectares. The study 
therefore converted the land transfers into percentages and used these 
percentages to shock the SAM. Also, because transfer of land from large-scale 
to small-scale users meant transfer of land income from large-scale to 
smallholder agriculture, the shocks included the percentage transfer of land 
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and land income from large-scale to smallholders simultaneously. The shocks 
applied to the SAM are based on the following premises: 
 
i)  The post-independence government of Zimbabwe proposed a 
resettlement package for 162,000 farm families on 8.3 million hectares of 
land between 1980 and 1997. 
ii)  By the end of 1996 71,000 farm families were resettled on 3.6 million 
hectares of land and iii) the land area belonging to large-scale commercial 
farmers decreased from 14.8 million hectares in 1980 to 11.3 million 
hectares in 1997. 
iii)  It is assumed that the transferred land was the utilization portion of large-
scale land holdings. 
 
Based on the above premises the following shocks were therefore applied to 
the SAM: 
 
Simulation I: If the proposed resettlement programme was successfully 
implemented, it would have implied that 8.3 million hectares of land was 
transferred from large-scale commercial to small-scale farmers. This quantity 
represents about 56 percent of large scale commercial farmland. In the SAM, 
this is equivalent to about Z$256.22 million worth of land transferred from 
large-scale commercial to small-scale farmers. In experiment I, Z$256.22 worth 
of land is transferred from large-scale land to small-scale land and the land 
equivalent land income from large-scale owner to smallholder households. For 
this experiment, the study assumes that large-scale commercial farmers are not 
compensated by government or the foreign sector with an equivalent amount.  
 
Simulation II: Records show that by the end of 1997, 3.5 million hectares of 
land was actually transferred from large-scale commercial to the settlers, who 
are also smallholder farmers. This is equivalent to about 23 percent of the total 
land holdings of large-scale commercial farmers. This implies that in the SAM, 
Z$105.23 million worth of land was transferred from large-scale commercial 
farmers to smallholders. It is also assumed that the large-scale commercial 
farmers are not compensated with the monetary equivalent of land 
transferred. The experiment involves the transfer of Z$105.23 worth of land 
from large-scale to small-scale users. 
 
Simulations III and IV: Repetition of experiments I and II respectively, with 
adequate compensation from government or the foreign sector to the large-
scale farmers who willingly offer their land for re-sale. This was what the post-
independent government of Zimbabwe, the former colonial masters and 
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interested non governmental organization agreed on in the Lancaster meeting.  
All the four simulations assumed that the transferred land was the utilizable 
portion of large-scale commercial farmland. 
 
4. Presentation  of  results 
 
This section presents and discusses the simulation results. The discussion 
mainly focuses on the possible impact of t r a n s f e r  o f  l a n d  f r o m  l a r g e - s c a l e  
commercial farmers to smallholders on output, factor payments or value 
added and household income.  These results are presented in Table 2. 
Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 present the results of the experiments in absolute 
figures. These indicate absolute changes from the base figures, while on 
columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 present percentage changes from the base output, value 




Rows 1 to 8 of Table 2 show the possible impact of land transfer from large-
scale commercial farmers to smallholders for the different simulations or 
experiments. On aggregate, the results show that the transfer of land from 
large-scale to small-scale users without adequate compensation is likely lead 
to a decrease in output by Z$26.524 million under scenario I and Z$12.371 
million under scenario II. In percentage terms, these figures represent a 
decrease of 0.022 percent and 0.01 percent respectively from the base output.  
On the other hand, with adequate compensation, aggregate output increases 
by Z$77.454 million and Z$43.713 million respectively for both scenarios III 
and IV. These changes represent an increase of 0.065 percent for scenario III 
and 0.037 percent for scenario IV. 
 
However, the changes are different for the different sectors in the SAM. In all 
the four scenarios, output falls in the large-scale agricultural sector, though the 
magnitude of change is minimized with adequate compensation for large-
scale land owners. The results also indicate that the manufacturing sector also 
experiences a possible decrease in output for all the four scenarios. Like the 
large-scale agricultural sector, the magnitude of the decrease decreases with 
adequate compensation for the large-scale land owners. The redistribution has 
a direct impact on the large-scale agriculture sector. But because of inter-
sectoral linkages, the manufacturing sector is also negatively affected, through 
the multiplier (see row 4, column 1 on Table A2). Conversely, according to the 
results of the experiments, all the other sectors experience an increase in 
output, with the smallholder agriculture sector having a disproportionately 
larger share of the increase. This holds for all the four scenarios. 
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4.2 Gross  value  added 
 
In literature gross value added is equal to output minus intermediate 
consumption. This represents payments to the factors of production, which 
include wages, rents on land and interest/profits on capital. 
 
Overall, the results indicate that land redistribution from large-scale to 
smallholder farmers, with or without compensation, could possibly increase 
value added. However, the situation is different for each of the components of 
gross value added. The experimental results for the four labour categories and 
the aggregate impact on wages are shown in rows 9 to 13 of Table 2. On the 
aggregate, all the four experiments show that land transfer could lead to an 
increase in wages. Specifically, all the experimental results show that the 
wages of the informal smallholder unskilled labourers would increase with 
land transfer from large-scale to smallholder farmers, while the other 
categories’ wages would only increases with adequate compensation for large-
scale land owners. 
As with labour, the results also show that land transfer without adequate 
compensation could lead to a significant decrease in gross interest/profit to 
large-scale capital. Conversely, the same experimental results show that 
interest on capital would significantly increase for small-scale capital. 
Specifically, the results of experiments I and II show that without 
compensation gross interest/profits could decrease by 0.095 and 0.047 percent 
respectively. With compensation, all the forms of capital and their aggregate, 
could receive increased interest/profits as shown in rows 14 to 17 of columns 
3 and 4, and expressed in percentages in columns 7 and 8 of Table 2.  
 
The experimental results also show the possible consequences of land 
redistribution on land rents. The possible consequences for large-scale and 
smallholder land and the aggregate situation for both categories are presented 
in rows 19, 20 and 21 respectively. On aggregate, the results indicate that land 
reform could increase the rent paid to land owners. The aggregate situation 
shows possible increase in rent by 2.466 percent, 1.444 percent, 1.868 percent 
and 0.742 percent for experiments I, II, III and IV respectively. However, the 
possible increase in land rent may be due to the increase in land rent to 
smallholder land, since the simulation results show that for each of the four 
experiments large-scale land-rent decreases. The aggregate situation suggests 
that, though large-scale land rent decreases, the increase in smallholder land 
rent could be higher than the decrease in the former, hence, an overall net 
increase in land rent. 
 
  305Agrekon, Vol 45, No 3 (September 2006)  Juana 
 
 
Table 2:  The impact of land reform policies on output, factor payments and 





































































































































































































































































































































LS Agriculture(1)  -121.094  -78.341  -46.461  -18.903 -1.322 -0.855 -0.507 -0.206 
SH Agriculture (2)  151.838  97.583  148.438  60.349 3.253 2.091 3.180 1.293 
Mining(3) 4.199  2.562  3.540  1.438 0.095 0.058 0.080 0.032 
Manufacturing(4) -85.882  -52.061  -71.010  -28.850 -0.189 -0.114 -0.156 -0.063 
Electricity(5) 4.354  2.661  3.685 1.499 0.204 0.124 0.172 0.070 
Construction(6) 0.925  0.593  0.897 0.365 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.006 
Services(7) 19.136  14.631  38.365  27.814 0.041 0.032 0.083 0.060 
AGGREGATE (8)  -26.524  -12.371  77.454 43.713 -0.022 -0.010  0.065  0.037 
LSU Workers(9)  -2.040  -1.229  1.652 0.672  -2.047  -1.233 1.657 0.674 
Formal U Workers (10)  -1.125  0.709 1.042 0.424  -0.150 0.094 0.139 0.056 
Inf. SHU Workers (11)  20.997  12.241  15.320 6.232 0.964 0.562 0.704 0.286 
Skilled Workers (12)  -8.962  -3.679  24.426 9.937  -0.091  -0.037 0.249 0.101 
AGGREGATE (13)  8.870 8.042  42.439  17.265 0.069 0.063 0.330 0.134 
LS Capital (14)  -36.912  -22.058  29.152 11.864 -2.147 -1.283  1.696  0.690 
SH Capital (15)  17.106  12.098  4.999 2.034 6.578 4.652 1.922 0.782 
Other Capital (16)  7.566  3.941  15.727 6.394 0.070 0.036 0.145 0.059 
AGGREGATE (17)  -12.240 -6.019 49.878 20.292 -0.095  -0.047 0.388 0.158 
LS Land (18)  -97.237  -100.515  -252.792  -102.765  -21.253 -21.969 -55.251 -22.461 
SH Land (19)  111.896  109.097  263.895  107.175 81.794 79.748  192.903 78.343 
AGGREGATE (20)  14.659  8.581  11.103  4.410  2.466 1.444 1.868 0.742 
Total Value Added  (21)  11.288 34.422  103.421 41.967  0.043 0.131 0.393 0.160 
LS Owner/Manager (22)  -251.759  -154.147  -214.432  -87.157 -2.722 -1.666 -2.318 -0.942 
LS Farm-workers (23)  -2.040  -1.229  -1.652 -0.672 -2.047 -1.233 -1.657 -0.674 
SH Households (24)  328.899  200.044  274.803  121.613 17.983 10.938 15.025  6.103 
Urban High Income (25)  -31.301  -19.167 6.649 4.840  -0.252  -0.155 0.054 0.039 
Urban Low Income (26)  15.567  9.137  11.612 4.724 0.603 0.354 0.450 0.183 
AGGREGATE (27)  59.365  34.638  76.980  43.348 0.227 0.132 0.294 0.167 
Source: Extracted from the simulation results. 
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4.3 Household  income  generation 
 
The major aim of the land re-settlement programme was to redress the high 
income inequity between predominantly white commercial farmers and the 
peasant smallholders or the landless, the majority of whom live in rural areas.   
 
The results of the first experiment show an increase of Z$59:365 million, which 
represents an increase of about 0.227 percent from the base household income. 
However, while the results show a substantial increase in smallholder 
households’ income, it at the same time indicates a decrease in the incomes of 
large-scale land owners, large-scale farm-workers and urban high income 
households, but the increase in the former is more than the decrease in the 
latter household groups, hence, a positive net increase in households’ 
aggregate income. The second, third and fourth experiments also yield a 
similar pattern of results, but with decreased negative impact on the incomes 
of large-scale owners and large-scale farm-worker households.  
 
Specific details of the impact of land redistribution on households’ income are 
presented in rows 23 to 28 of Table 2. Generally, the results show that while 
land redistribution could lead to a net increase in households’ income, it leads 
to a decrease in the incomes of large-scale owner households. Nonetheless, the 
decrease in large-scale owner households, income could be adequately 
compensated by the increase in smallholder households’ income.  
 
5.  Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
This study quantitatively investigated the impact land reform polices in 
Zimbabwe could have on output, gross value added and households’ income 
in the country. It looked at welfare and equity issues that could possibly be 
addressed by land reform, specifically in favour of the rural poor farmers in 
post-independence Zimbabwe. The study used the 1991 social accounting 
matrix for Zimbabwe, which was updated by the 1998 household survey data 
provided by the Central Statistics Office of Zimbabwe. Information on the 
transfer of land was extracted from records of the deeds registries in Harare 
and Bulawayo. Using these data sources, the study computed the SAM 
multipliers and simulated the impact of land transfers on output, gross value 
added and households’ income.  The simulations were based on four different 
scenarios. 
From the simulations results, it can be argued that land reform in Zimbabwe: 
i)  Can only increase output if the losers are adequately compensated. In the 
scenarios where the large-scale land owners are not compensated, the 
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results show a decrease in output. In the last two experiments, where the 
large-scale land owners are assumed to be adequately compensated, the 
results show a general increase in output. However, whether 
compensated or not, the results indicate a decrease in output for the large-
scale agriculture sector and an increase for the smallholder agriculture 
sector. With adequate compensation, the total decrease in output of the 
negatively impacted sectors will be less than the increase in output of the 
positively impacted sectors, leading to a net increase. 
ii)  Can lead to a net increase in gross value added. All the four experiments 
show that land redistribution has the possible impact of increasing gross 
value added, though the scenario results indicate differences in the net 
effect for the different components of value added. Both the labour and 
capital components of value added show a net decrease in value added 
without compensation and a positive net increase with compensation, 
while land shows a net increase for all the four scenarios, though rent on 
large-scale land decreases in each of the four scenarios. 
iii)  Has the potential of increasing households’ income.  The results of all the 
four experiments show a net increase in households’ income, though this 
has a negative impact on the incomes of large-scale owner households. 
These results indicate that, while the incomes of large-scale owner 
households are likely to decrease with land reforms in Zimbabwe, the 
possible increase in the incomes of smallholder households is likely to 
outweigh the decrease in the incomes of the former, which leads to a net 
increase in households’ income. Therefore, land reform has the potential 
of improving households’ welfare according to the welfare compensation 
criterion. That is, those who gain from the programme can adequately 
compensate the losers and still have some net gains. 
 
Based on the above findings, the study generally concludes that, if the land 
reform programme in Zimbabwe is properly planned and cautiously 
implemented, it can potentially increase output and gross value added and 
redistribute income from large-scale owner households to smallholder 
households, hence could be generally beneficial for the economy of 
Zimbabwe. For these benefits to be desirable for the whole economy, the study 
shows that measures should be taken to adequately compensate the large-scale 
land owners, whose land is transferred to smallholders. 
 
Generally, the land reform programme encountered some significant problems 
between 1980 and 1997, which made the economy-wide benefits far less than 
the potential benefits shown by the simulation results of the study. The 
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following were the major problems and setbacks that inhibited the efficient 
and successful implementation of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe: 
i)  Most large scale commercial farmers were unwilling to sell the productive 
areas of their land. What they offered for sale to the government or on the 
open market were marginal areas that were less productive. These were 
also sold at high prices, thereby deliberately pricing out the most 
vulnerable and poor (Rugube and Chambati, 2001; Lebert, 2003). This 
means that willing-seller-willing-buyer framework for redistribution did 
not work well to achieve the objectives of land resettlement.   
ii)  In the implementation process, government acquired land was often 
given to government stalwarts and corrupt government officials, thereby 
reducing the chances of the most vulnerable to benefit from the 
programme (Rugube and Chambati, 2001). 
 
The study therefore recommends that to successfully implement the land 
reform programme and to gain economy-wide benefits, the large-scale farmers 
who offer their land must be adequately compensated and that a more 
transparent and coordinated institutional structure is instituted to enhance 
stakeholder participation in the redistribution process. The involvement of all 
the stakeholders in planning and implementing land reform is crucial for the 
realization of the potential benefits of land reform. 
 
The scope of the current study is limited to the economy-wide analysis of land 
reforms in Zimbabwe. There is still the need to investigate the specific benefits 
derived from land reform in specific economic activities, such as small-scale 
cotton and tobacco farmers. There is also the need to investigate how the 
potential benefits of land reforms are distributed when jointly implemented 
with other macro-policies such as the removal of subsidies and tariffs and 
increasing or decreasing land tax. 
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LS  Agric  0.2376 0.0025 0.0000 0.0593 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 
SH  Agric  0.4347 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mining  0.0000 0.0000 0.4751 0.0222 0.0191 0.0424 0.0026 
Manufacturing  0.0689 0.1454 0.1302 0.4400 0.0273 0.2506 0.0998 
Electricity    0.0043 0.0078 0.0107 0.0020 0.5873 0.0016 0.0007 
Construction  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.5172 0.0057 
Services  0.1510 0.1280 0.0696 0.1068 0.0117 0.0354 0.5979 
LSU  Workers  0.0037 0.0141 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Formal  U  Workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0080 0.0042 0.0116 0.0080 0.0097 
Informal  SHU  Workers  0.0000 0.1466 0.0000 0.0079 0.0000 0.0084 0.0234 
Skilled  Workers  0.0147 0.1117 0.0736 0.0445 0.1018 0.0805 0.1317 
LS  Capital  0.0546 0.2613 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SH  Capital  0.0000 0.0557 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other  Capital  0.0000 0.0000 0.1848 0.1003 0.2139 0.0306 0.1043 
LS  Land  0.0085 0.0578 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SH  Land  0.0027 0.0475 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Firms  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LS  Owner/Manager  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LS  Farm-workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SH  Households  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Urban  High  Income  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Urban  Low  Income  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Government  0.0139 0.0217 0.0255 0.0486 0.0273 0.0251 0.0123 
Investment   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Rest of the world  0.0052 0.0000 0.0225 0.1637 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097 
  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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LS  Agric  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SH  Agric  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mining  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Manufacturing  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Electricity    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Construction  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Services  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LSU  Workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Formal  U  Workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Informal  SHU  Workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Skilled  Workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LS  Capital  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SH  Capital  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other  Capital  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LS  Land  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SH  Land  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Firms  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9883 
LS  Owner/Manager  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0825 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LS  Farm-workers  1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SH  Households  0.0000 0.0000 0.3220 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Urban  High  Income  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9148 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Urban  Low  Income  0.0000 1.0000 0.6780 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0117 
Government  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Investment   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Rest of the world  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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LS  Agric  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0457 0.3480 0.0868 0.0148 
SH  Agric  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3745 0.0000 
Mining  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Manufacturing  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4900 0.5478 0.3547 0.4807 
Electricity    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0123 0.0083 0.0057 0.0328 
Construction  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Services  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2324 0.0765 0.1289 0.1985 
LSU  Workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Formal  U  Workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Informal  SHU  Workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Skilled  Workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LS  Capital  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SH  Capital  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other  Capital  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LS  Land  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SH  Land  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Firms  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LS  Owner/Manager  1.0000 0.0000 0.4627 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LS  Farm-workers  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SH  Households  0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064 
Urban  High  Income  0.0000 0.0000 0.2768 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Urban  Low  Income  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Government  0.0000 0.0000 0.1396 0.0744 0.0000 0.0115 0.1000 
Investment  0.0000 0.0000 0.0760 0.1452 0.0193 0.0379 0.1668 
Rest of the world  0.0000 0.0000 0.0448 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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LS Agric  0.1709  0.0000  -0.0059  0.3284 
SH Agric  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Mining 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0986 
Manufacturing 0.4987  0.0215  0.5658  0.1798 
Electricity   0.0271  0.0014  0.0000  0.0000 
Construction 0.0000  0.0000  0.5423  0.0000 
 Services  0.1096  0.3082  0.0000  0.1770 
LSU Workers  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Formal U Workers  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Informal SHU Workers  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Skilled Workers  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
LS Capital  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
SH Capital  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Other Capital  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
LS Land  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
SH Land  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Firms 0.0000  0.0838  0.0000  0.0000 
LS Owner/Manager  0.0000  0.0440  0.0000  0.0113 
LS Farm-workers  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
SH Households  0.0693  0.0331  0.0000  0.0000 
Urban High Income  0.0000  0.0074  0.0000  0.0000 
Urban Low Income  0.0000  0.0166  0.0000  0.0000 
Government  0.0428 0.4899  0.0000 0.0322 
Investment  0.0816 -0.0349  -0.1022  0.1727 
Rest of the world  0.0000 0.0290  0.0000 0.0000 
 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
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LS  Agric  1.591 0.303 0.212 0.286 0.202 0.250  0.244 
SH  Agric  0.742 1.205 0.108 0.141 0.103 0.128  0.131 
Mining  0.107 0.107 1.997 0.135 0.168 0.278  0.110 
Manufacturing  2.112 2.148 1.838 2.929 1.627 2.320  1.975 
Electricity    0.126 0.126 0.138 0.078 2.521 0.103  0.107 
Construction  0.028 0.025 0.021 0.020 0.018 2.093  0.048 
Services  2.161 1.896 1.552 1.405 1.327 1.543  3.840 
LSU  Workers  0.017 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003  0.003 
Formal  U  Workers  0.033 0.029 0.041 0.028 0.050 0.045  0.048 
Informal  SHU  Workers  0.146 0.700 0.067 0.075 0.059 0.091  0.128 
Skilled  Workers  0.516 0.384 0.464 0.355 0.532 0.524  0.634 
LS  Capital  0.300 0.077 0.040 0.054 0.038 0.045  0.046 
SH  Capital  0.030 0.243 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007  0.008 
Other  Capital  0.485 0.459 0.745 0.483 0.873 0.531  0.643 
LS  Land  0.079 0.020 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.013  0.012 
SH  Land  0.016 0.128 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004  0.004 
Firms  0.479 0.455 0.737 0.477 0.863 0.525  0.636 
LS  Owner/Manager  0.619 0.679 0.430 0.316 0.491 0.346  0.407 
LS  Farm-workers  0.016 0.018 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003  0.003 
SH  Households  0.135 0.197 0.041 0.046 0.039 0.052  0.066 
Urban  High  Income  0.597 0.590 0.628 0.457 0.726 0.624  0.757 
Urban  Low  Income  0.158 0.197 0.095 0.086 0.101 0.113  0.140 
SAM  production  multiplier  6.868 5.810 5.866 4.994 5.967 6.714  6.454 
Total  SAM  impact  multiplier  10.508 9.729 9.177 7.403 9.761 9.641  9.987 
 
 
  316Agrekon, Vol 45, No 3 (September 2006)  Juana 
 
 












































































































LS  Agric  0.731  0.473 0.445 0.222 0.272 0.386  0.190 0.272 0.386 
SH  Agric  0.347  0.255 0.361 0.114 0.135 0.583  0.095 0.135 0.583 
Mining  0.121  0.110 0.111 0.095 0.099 0.112  0.072 0.099 0.112 
Manufacturing  2.504  2.241 2.257 1.903 2.011 2.291  1.465 2.011 2.291 
Electricity    0.116  0.149 0.138 0.140 0.100 0.114  0.087 0.100 0.114 
Construction  0.025  0.022 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.025  0.016 0.023 0.025 
Services  1.826  1.658 1.736 1.535 1.696 1.898  1.212 1.696 1.898 
LSU  Workers  1.008  0.005 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.010  0.002 0.003 0.010 
Formal  U  Workers  0.031  1.028 0.029 0.025 0.027 0.031  0.020 0.027 0.031 
Inf  SHU  Workers  0.113  0.094 1.111 0.068 0.075 0.148  0.054 0.075 0.148 
Skilled  Workers  0.424  0.378 0.400 1.326 0.351 0.445  0.254 0.351 0.445 
LS  Capital  0.130  0.092 0.119 0.042 1.050 0.173  0.035 0.050 0.173 
SH  Capital  0.019  0.014 0.020 0.006 0.008 1.033  0.005 0.008 0.033 
Other  Capital  0.490  0.451 0.458 0.399 0.419 0.474  1.306 0.419 0.474 
LS  Land  0.035  0.025 0.032 0.011 0.013 0.049  0.009 1.013 0.049 
SH  Land  0.010  0.007 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.017  0.003 0.004 1.017 
Firms  0.484  0.445 0.453 0.395 0.414 0.468  1.291 0.414 0.468 
LS  Owner/Manager  0.424  0.354 0.393 0.345 1.284 0.476  0.663 1.284 0.476 
L.S  Farm-workers  1.008  0.005 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.010  0.002 0.003 0.010 
SH  Households  0.077  0.131 0.446 0.045 0.044 1.110  0.034 0.044 1.110 
Urban  High  Income  0.522  0.470 0.491 1.322 0.436 0.536  0.589 0.436 0.536 
Urban  Low  Income  0.113  1.097 0.788 0.076 0.083 0.137  0.072 0.083 0.137 
Total  impact  multiplier 10.558 9.507 9.835 8.098 8.549  10.525 7.476 8.549  10.525 
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LS  Agric  0.186 0.272 0.731 0.386 0.218 0.473 
SH  Agric  0.093 0.135 0.347 0.583 0.112 0.255 
Mining  0.072 0.099 0.121 0.112 0.095 0.110 
Manufacturing  1.456 2.011 2.504 2.291 1.899 2.241 
Electricity    0.086 0.100 0.116 0.114 0.144 0.149 
Construction  0.016 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.020 0.022 
Services  1.207 1.696 1.826 1.898 1.525 1.658 
LSU  Workers  0.002 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.005 
Formal  U  Workers  0.020 0.027 0.031 0.031 0.025 0.028 
Informal  SHU  Workers  0.054 0.075 0.113 0.148 0.067 0.094 
Skilled  Workers  0.252 0.351 0.424 0.445 0.324 0.378 
LS  Capital  0.035 0.050 0.130 0.173 0.041 0.092 
SH  Capital  0.005 0.008 0.019 0.033 0.006 0.014 
Other  Capital  0.304 0.419 0.490 0.474 0.399 0.451 
LS  Land  0.009 0.013 0.035 0.049 0.011 0.025 
SH  Land  0.003 0.004 0.010 0.017 0.003 0.007 
Firms  1.301 0.414 0.484 0.468 0.394 0.445 
LS  Owner/Manager  0.666 1.284 0.424 0.476 0.261 0.354 
LS  Farm-workers  0.002 0.003 1.008 0.010 0.002 0.005 
SH  Households  0.033 0.044 0.077 1.110 0.045 0.131 
Urban  High  Income  0.591 0.436 0.522 0.536 1.406 0.470 
Urban  Low  Income  0.059 0.083 0.113 0.137 0.076 1.097 
Total  impact  multiplier  6.452 7.549 9.558 9.525 7.078 8.507 
 
 
  318